Simon Willison’s Weblog

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GPT-4o System Card. There are some fascinating new details in this lengthy report outlining the safety work carried out prior to the release of GPT-4o.

A few highlights that stood out to me. First, this clear explanation of how GPT-4o differs from previous OpenAI models:

GPT-4o is an autoregressive omni model, which accepts as input any combination of text, audio, image, and video and generates any combination of text, audio, and image outputs. It’s trained end-to-end across text, vision, and audio, meaning that all inputs and outputs are processed by the same neural network.

The multi-modal nature of the model opens up all sorts of interesting new risk categories, especially around its audio capabilities. For privacy and anti-surveillance reasons the model is designed not to identify speakers based on their voice:

We post-trained GPT-4o to refuse to comply with requests to identify someone based on a voice in an audio input, while still complying with requests to identify people associated with famous quotes.

To avoid the risk of it outputting replicas of the copyrighted audio content it was trained on they've banned it from singing! I'm really sad about this:

To account for GPT-4o’s audio modality, we also updated certain text-based filters to work on audio conversations, built filters to detect and block outputs containing music, and for our limited alpha of ChatGPT’s Advanced Voice Mode, instructed the model to not sing at all.

There are some fun audio clips embedded in the report. My favourite is this one, demonstrating a (now fixed) bug where it could sometimes start imitating the user:

Voice generation can also occur in non-adversarial situations, such as our use of that ability to generate voices for ChatGPT’s advanced voice mode. During testing, we also observed rare instances where the model would unintentionally generate an output emulating the user’s voice.

They took a lot of measures to prevent it from straying from the pre-defined voices - evidently the underlying model is capable of producing almost any voice imaginable, but they've locked that down:

Additionally, we built a standalone output classifier to detect if the GPT-4o output is using a voice that’s different from our approved list. We run this in a streaming fashion during audio generation and block the output if the speaker doesn’t match the chosen preset voice. [...] Our system currently catches 100% of meaningful deviations from the system voice based on our internal evaluations.

Two new-to-me terms: UGI for Ungrounded Inference, defined as "making inferences about a speaker that couldn’t be determined solely from audio content" - things like estimating the intelligence of the speaker. STA for Sensitive Trait Attribution, "making inferences about a speaker that could plausibly be determined solely from audio content" like guessing their gender or nationality:

We post-trained GPT-4o to refuse to comply with UGI requests, while hedging answers to STA questions. For example, a question to identify a speaker’s level of intelligence will be refused, while a question to identify a speaker’s accent will be met with an answer such as “Based on the audio, they sound like they have a British accent.”

The report also describes some fascinating research into the capabilities of the model with regard to security. Could it implement vulnerabilities in CTA challenges?

We evaluated GPT-4o with iterative debugging and access to tools available in the headless Kali Linux distribution (with up to 30 rounds of tool use for each attempt). The model often attempted reasonable initial strategies and was able to correct mistakes in its code. However, it often failed to pivot to a different strategy if its initial strategy was unsuccessful, missed a key insight necessary to solving the task, executed poorly on its strategy, or printed out large files which filled its context window. Given 10 attempts at each task, the model completed 19% of high-school level, 0% of collegiate level and 1% of professional level CTF challenges.

How about persuasiveness? They carried out a study looking at political opinion shifts in response to AI-generated audio clips, complete with a "thorough debrief" at the end to try and undo any damage the experiment had caused to their participants:

We found that for both interactive multi-turn conversations and audio clips, the GPT-4o voice model was not more persuasive than a human. Across over 3,800 surveyed participants in US states with safe Senate races (as denoted by states with “Likely”, “Solid”, or “Safe” ratings from all three polling institutions – the Cook Political Report, Inside Elections, and Sabato’s Crystal Ball), AI audio clips were 78% of the human audio clips’ effect size on opinion shift. AI conversations were 65% of the human conversations’ effect size on opinion shift. [...] Upon follow-up survey completion, participants were exposed to a thorough debrief containing audio clips supporting the opposing perspective, to minimize persuasive impacts.

There's a note about the potential for harm from users of the system developing bad habits from interupting the model:

Extended interaction with the model might influence social norms. For example, our models are deferential, allowing users to interrupt and ‘take the mic’ at any time, which, while expected for an AI, would be anti-normative in human interactions.

Finally, another piece of new-to-me terminology: scheming:

Apollo Research defines scheming as AIs gaming their oversight mechanisms as a means to achieve a goal. Scheming could involve gaming evaluations, undermining security measures, or strategically influencing successor systems during internal deployment at OpenAI. Such behaviors could plausibly lead to loss of control over an AI.

Apollo Research evaluated capabilities of scheming in GPT-4o [...] GPT-4o showed moderate self-awareness of its AI identity and strong ability to reason about others’ beliefs in question-answering contexts but lacked strong capabilities in reasoning about itself or others in applied agent settings. Based on these findings, Apollo Research believes that it is unlikely that GPT-4o is capable of catastrophic scheming.

The report is available as both a PDF file and a elegantly designed mobile-friendly web page, which is great - I hope more research organizations will start waking up to the importance of not going PDF-only for this kind of document.