Simon Willison’s Weblog

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Tuesday, 26th May 2026

I cannot believe I'm saying this, but getting the literal Pope to canonize your product's specific technical limitations as a spiritual treatise is the single greatest act of vendor lobbying I have ever seen.

Corey Quinn, on Anthropic co-founder Christopher Olah's influence on Magnifica Humanitas

# 2:28 am / ai, anthropic, ai-ethics, corey-quinn

A lot of the emails I get from founders are now written in a hard-hitting journalistic style. I know they're written by AI, because no founder ever wrote this way before. And once you realize something is written by AI, it's hard not to ignore it.

I have never knowingly finished reading an email signed by a human but written by AI. It feels like being lied to, and who would stand for that?

[...] It makes me think less of the author. It means they can't write well unaided (or feel they can't), and that they're trying to trick me.

It's not impressive to use AI to write stuff for you; any teenager can do that.

Paul Graham

# 3:02 pm / paul-graham, writing, ai, generative-ai, llms, ai-misuse

Microsoft Copilot Cowork Exfiltrates Files (via) The biggest challenge in designing agentic systems continues to be preventing them from enabling attackers to exfiltrate data.

In this case Microsoft Copilot Cowork (yes, that's a real product name) was allowing agents to send emails to the user's own inbox without approval... but those messages were then displayed in a way that could leak data to an attacker via rendered images:

Because these messages can contain external images that trigger network requests to external websites, data can be exfiltrated when a user opens a compromised message sent by the agent.

Since OneDrive can create pre-authenticated download links, a successful prompt injection could cause those links to be leaked, allowing files to be downloaded by the attacker.

# 3:36 pm / microsoft, security, ai, prompt-injection, generative-ai, llms, exfiltration-attacks, lethal-trifecta

The pressure (via) Daniel Stenberg on the unprecedented level of pressure the curl team are facing right now thanks to the deluge of (credible) AI-assisted security issues being reported.

The rate of incoming security reports is 4-5 times higher than it was in 2024 and double the speed of 2025 -- meaning that on average we now get more than one report per day. The quality is way higher than ever before. The reports are typically very detailed and long. [...]

For the first time in my life, my wife voiced concerns about my work hours and my imbalanced work/life situation. I work more than I’ve done before, but the flood keeps coming. [...]

This is a never-before seen or experienced pressure on the curl project and its security team members. An avalanche of high priority work that trumps all other things in the project that is primarily mental because we certainly could ignore them all if we wanted, but we feel a responsibility, we have a conscience and we are proud about our work.

The good news is that curl is a very solid piece of software, so the vulnerabilities people are finding tend not to be of high severity:

What is also a good trend: almost no one finds terrible vulnerabilities. All vulnerabilities found the last few years in curl have all been deemed severity LOW or MEDIUM. I'm not saying there won't be any more HIGH ever, but at least they are rare. The most recent severity high curl CVE was published in October 2023.

# 11:48 pm / curl, security, ai, generative-ai, llms, daniel-stenberg, ai-ethics, ai-security-research

Monday, 25th May 2026
Wednesday, 27th May 2026